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SUMMARY OP ARGUMENTS
Due process is a constitutionally guaranteed protection for
all citizens.

Substantive due process requires that relevant legal

principles be considered when making a judicial decision.

When

relevant legal factors are ignored, an abuse of discretion occurs
resulting in a violation of a party's due process rights.

The

trial court's failure to consider the Westinghouse factors before
dismissing the present action constitutes an abuse of discretion
and a denial of plaintiffs' substantive due process rights.
The final delay in the present case was caused by Defendants'
request that the scheduled trial be continued to allow new counsel
to appear
attorneys,

for Defendants.
the

case

But for the request

would

have

been

tried

to substitute

in January,

1994.

Defendants caused the last delay and have relied on that delay for
their Motion to Dismiss

for Failure to Prosecute.

The trial

court's dismissal rewards the defendants for their delay tactics.
Plaintiffs have suffered a great injustice by this dismissal.
Defendants committed accounting malpractice and cost Plaintiffs
their fortune.

Plaintiffs have been victimized not only by the

practices

of Defendants, but also by the dismissal which has

stripped

Plaintiffs

of

their

opportunity

for

renumeration.

Plaintiffs are entitled to the opportunity for a trial so that
justice may be done between the parties.

1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS1 DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY
THE IMPROPER DISMISSAL OF ITS ACTION
In Plaintiffs1 Brief on Appeal, they established a violation
of their substantive due process rights when the trial court failed
to consider the elements of Westinghouse Electric Supply Company
Co. v. Paul Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d
1975),

before

prejudice.

dismissing

Plaintiffs'

cause

876, 879
of

(Utah,

action

with

Plaintiffs' due process rights demand the consideration

of each element of Westinghouse

in order to protect against a

dismissal for arbitrary and capricious reasons.
872 P.2d 1041

(Utah App. 1994).

State v. Parker,

When the trial court fails to

consider the relevant elements established by judicial precedent,
arbitrary and capricious decisions and abuses of discretion result.
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).

In the present case,

the trial court abused its discretion in failing to specifically
consider the Westinghouse elements for dismissal.

This failure

constitutes a violation of Plaintiffs' substantive due process
rights.

The trial court's decision, therefore, should be reversed

and the matter remanded.
In

response

to

the

Plaintiffs'

substantive

due

process

arguments, Defendants make only one unsubstantiated statement in
their brief:
. . . For Strands to argue their substantive due
process rights have been violated . . . , ignores the
fact that the Strands themselves have not been diligent
in trying the matter. Strands, through their inaction,
2

have waived their own substantive due process rights as
will be shown hereafter.
Defendants never again refer to the due process arguments of
Plaintiffs, and provide no authority for this alleged "waiver" of
their due process rights.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "cdurts
indulge

every

presumption

constitutional rights."
F.2d

555, 557

against

the

waiver

of

fundamental

Pitts v. Board of Education of U.S.D.. 869

(10th Cir. 1989) (quoting

from United

Williamson. 806 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1986)).

States v.

And, while due

process rights may be waived, the waiver must be an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.

See Johnson v.

Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).
To

avoid

any

perception

that

Plaintiffs

waived

their

constitutional rights in the present case, Plaintiffs asked the
trial court to reconsider its prior decision and expressly asked
that court to recognize and protect their substantive due process
rights in the second hearing.
rights,

Plaintiffs

took

Thus, far from relinquishing those

affirmative

substantive due process rights.

action

to

protect

their

Unfortunately, the trial court

simply ignored the Plaintiffs' rights and entered the dismissal.
The fact that the trial court failed to consider and weigh the
relevant

factors

at

the

conclusion

of

the

second

hearing

constitutes a clear violation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
Nothing that Plaintiffs did or said could possibly be considered as
a voluntary and knowing waiver or relinquishment of those rights.

3

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY FAILING TO APPLY THE WESTINGHOUSE STANDARD
IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S ACTION
The trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's claims with
prejudice without specifically considering the necessary elements
in making that decision.

The necessary elements of Westinghouse

Electric Supply Co. v. Paul Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876,
879 (Utah 1975), as set forth in Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 237
(Utah App. 1989), are:
The factors which we consider may include the following:
(1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each
party has to move the case forward; (3) what each of the
parties has done to move the case forward; (4) what
difficultly or prejudice may have been caused to the
other side; and (5) most important, whether injustice may
result from the dismissal.
When considering these factors, along with the Affidavit of Judge
Rokich and the fact that the trial was continued at the request of
Defendants, the dismissal with prejudice was a clear abuse of
discretion.
A.

CONDUCT OF BOTH PARTIES
In footnote 5, Defendants assert that the continuance was the

suggestion of Judge Rokich.

This is a complete misreading of the

Affidavit of Judge Rokich.

R. 306-307.

In that affidavit Judge

Rokich states:
5. At the September 17, 1994 scheduling conference
between the Court and the above-mentioned parties,
Defendants' counsel, Roger Sandack, indicated that he
would be replaced by subsequent counsel and would not be

4

the attorney representing the Defendants at the time of
trial.
6. Based on the disclosures of Mr. Sandack and the
consent of Mr. Petty, Affiant [Judge John A. Rokich]
determined that it would be inappropriate to enter a
scheduling order when counsel for Defendants was
changing.
Affiant [Judge Rokich] intended 'to set a
schedule for the completion of this action after
Defendants' new counsel had been designated.
Affiant
[Judge Rokich] intended to take no further action in
regard to this case until substitute counsel for
Defendants was designated.
Defense counsel requested or suggested the continuance of the
January 4, 1994 trial because of his alleged intent to withdraw.
Despite his representations to the trial court, Mr. Sandack did not
withdraw from this case until after the Motion to Dismiss had been
filed some ten months later.1
resulted

in

the

case

not

Therefore, the critical delay that

being

tried

was

caused

by

Defense

counsel's representations to the trial court and his failure to
withdraw in a timely manner.

This delay cannot be attributed to

Plaintiffs.2
For Defendants to argue that they are not responsible for the
continuation of the January 4, 1994 trial date and the ensuing
delay defies reason.

In filing the Motion to Dismiss for Failure

i The Defendants state that " . . . Martineau's previous
counsel, Roger Sandack, responded and appeared at all hearings and
did not withdraw until July 1995". [emphasis in original]. Brief
of Appellees, p. 14. Defendants' new counsel, Michael L. Deamer
appeared on June 2, 1995 and filed the Motion to Dismiss at the
same time he filed his Notice of Appearance of Counsel. R. 183186.
2 In addition, Defendants failed to designate their
expert and lay witnesses despite the Court Order of June 9, 1993.
Having failed to name any witnesses, it is obvious that Defendants
never intended to try this matter and they used every effort to
delay and continue the trial date.
5

to Prosecute prior to Mr. Sandack's withdrawal, Defendants sought
to be rewarded for Mr. Sandack's misstatements to the trial court
and Defendants' own delay tactics.
this result to stand.

This Court should not allow

"The ancient and honored maxim [is] that no

one should benefit from his own wrong . . .."

Prudential Federal

Savings and Loan Association v. William L. Pereira and Associates,
16 Utah 2d 365, 401 P.2d 439

(Utah 1965).

The trial court's

dismissal, which has rewarded Defendants for their delay tactics,
should be reversed and the matter remanded for a trial on the
merits.
B.

THE OPPORTUNITY OF EACH PARTY TO MOVE THE CASE FORWARD.
Defendants assert that no action was taken by Plaintiffs to

move this case forward.

However, Defendants can not deny that but

for Mr. Sandack's representation to the court in September, 1994,
this case would have been tried in January, 1994 and the Motion to
Dismiss would never have been heard or decided. !
Defendants argue that they attempted to move the case forward.
However, the postponement of the trial resulted directly from the
representation of Defendants' counsel that new counsel would be
substituted.

Because this postponement stopped the trial from

going forward, all actions preceding the September pretrial are
essentially irrelevant.

Had the request to substitute counsel not

6

been made, the trial would have been held

in January,

1994.3

In the past, this Court has not tolerated one party sitting
silently for a period of time and then attempting to blame the
other party for delay.

Department of Social Services v. Romero.

609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980), Westinghouse Electric Supply Co.
v. Paul W. Larsen Contractors. Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1977) .
Any delay from the September pretrial until the June 2, 1995 Motion
to Dismiss, was exclusively caused by the Defendants.

Defendants

requested time to change counsel, allowed time to pass, failed to
name substitute counsel, and then used this passage of time as a
reason to seek dismissal of the case.

Defendants simply should not

benefit from their own actions and misrepresentations.

C.

WHAT EACH PARTY DID TO MOVE THE CASE FORWARD.
Defendants' Brief fails to address this specific issue.

It

must therefore be assumed that the position of the Plaintiffs is
adopted by acquiescence.

Plaintiffs moved this case forward to the

point of scheduling the trial of the matter and attending the
September pretrial held before Judge Rokich.

Defendants averted

this scheduled trial by claiming that counsel would be substituted.

3
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint was
considered at the pre-trial conference, at which time the Court
continued the trial setting at the request of Defendants to change
attorneys. Since Judge Rokich " . . . intended to take no further
action in relation to this case until substitute counsel for the
Defendants was designated", Affidavit of Judge Rokich, R. 306-307,
the court did not rule on the Motion to Amend, which remains
pending.
7

forthcoming, counsel for Defendants did not withdraw until after
Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute.
Defendants are simply attempting to take advantage of and benefit
from their own delays.
D.

WHAT DIFFICULTY OR PREJUDICE WAS CAUSED TO DEFENDANTS.
Defendants

claim

that

because

of

the

passage

of

time

Plaintiffs have waived their claims of difficulty or prejudice as
a

result

of

the

dismissal.

However,

the

Supreme

Court

in

Westinghouse did not hold that the enumerated factors could be
waived by the passage of time.

Despite the allegations of delay,

the Supreme Court named the factors that must be considered in
every case of dismissal for failure to prosecute.

Furthermore,

Defendants site no authority for their alleged waiver.

In Living

Scriptures. Inc. v. Kudlik. 890 P.2d 7, 9 (Utah App. 1995), the
Court of Appeals sets forth the elements of waiver:
The elements of waiver consist of:
"(1) an existing
right, benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of the
existence of that right, benefit, or advantage; and (3)
an intention to relinquish the right, benefit, or
advantage."
(citation omitted)
The record is devoid of any intent by Plaintiffs to waive their
rights.

Clearly Plaintiffs had no "intention" to relinquish their

claims against Defendants.

There is no basis to presume that

Plaintiffs waived any of their substantive rights.4

4

Defendants make much of Mr. Strand's incarceration.
However, Mr. Strand does not forfeit his rights as a citizen of the
United States and the State of Utah simply because he may not
attend the trial or is incarcerated. Mr. Strand's deposition can
be taken and entered into the record. In addition, the other
8

E.

WHETHER INJUSTICE WILL RESULT FROM THE DISMISSAL.
Great injustice occurred to Plaintiffs as a result of the

dismissal because they suffered significant damages as a result of
Defendants' accounting malpractice.

Defendants double and triple

charged Plaintiffs for work performed, misappropriated funds from
Plaintiffs' checking accounts, filed improper tax returns, and
caused the destruction of profitable businesses.

The Utah Supreme

Court called the injustice suffered by the dismissed party the
"most important" of all the Westinghouse factors.

The injustice

suffered by Plaintiffs as a result of Defendants' malpractice is
now compounded by the dismissal.

Plaintiffs are entitled to have

their day in court to receive compensation for the intentional and
negligent acts of Defendants.
Again, instead of directly confronting the injustice suffered
by Plaintiffs as a result of the dismissal, Defendants focus on
their own alleged injustice of disclosing the pending malpractice
action and attorney's fees.

Not only is Defendants' argument

concerning disclosure and attorney's fees irrelevant, but based
entirely

on

speculation.

The

record

is devoid

of

any

facts

reflecting Defendants' disclosure of the malpractice action or any

Plaintiffs are available to attend the trial. Defendants simply
seek to cast aspersion on Plaintiffs because of Mr. Strand's
situation. The Court should easily see through this blatant and
inappropriate tactic.
9

resulting effect.

The record contains no facts concerning the

payment of attorney's fees.

The malpractice insurer is likely to

have covered the attorney's fees in any event.
Defendants

are

offended

that

Judge

Affidavit in opposition to the dismissal.
of Defendants' abhorrence to the truth.

Rokich would

file

an

This offense arises out
Judge Rokich's Affidavit

establishes that the case would have been tried in January, 1994
but for Roger Sandack's request to withdraw.

Judge Rokich presided

over the September pretrial hearing, when the January 4, 1994 trial
date was stricken.

He obviously believes that an injustice is

being wrought upon the Plaintiffs by the dismissal.

Judge Rokich

ruled that if counsel was being changed, it would be inappropriate
for the trial to go forward.
In fact, Judge Rokich determined that there should be no
further action in relation to the case until substitute counsel for
Defendants

had

been

designated.

R.

306-307.

Because

the

continuance of the scheduled trial and the subsequent delay was
caused by Defendants, it is inappropriate for the Plaintiffs to be
punished by the dismissal of the action.

CONCLUSION
Due process rights cannot be waived without an intentional
relinquishment of the known right.
of Plaintiffs' rights.
factors

of Westinghouse

The record reflects no waiver

The trial court failed to consider the
and

rendered

10

an unreasoned,

arbitrary

decision.

Plaintiffs are entitled to have their day in court to

pursue their claims against Defendants.
Defendants requested that the trial date be stricken so that
new counsel could take over the defense.

But for the request to

substitute counsel, the case would have been tried in January,
1994.

Despite the representation that counsel would withdraw, no

withdrawal took place until Defendants' new counsel filed a Motion
to Dismiss some ten months later.

The Defendants' should not be

rewarded with a dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims based on their own
misrepresentations

to

the

trial

court

and

delays

in

the

proceedings.
This Court should afford the parties an opportunity to be
heard and do justice between them by reversing the dismissal by
reversing the trial court's dismissal of and remanding the matter
for a trial on the merits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J%h<4

day of July, 1996.

—^£=^35^L
Daniel W. Jackson
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to Michael L. Deamer, 139 East South Temple #330,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1169, postage prepaid, this
of July, 1996.
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Affidavit of Judge John A. Rokich
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ADDENDUM A
Affidavit of Judge John A. Rokich

AUG-28-iyy:>
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RECEIVED AUS 3 * 1S35
Ralph C. Petty #2595
Attorney for Plaintiff
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 531-6686

FILED

R E C E I V t O AUG 2 S1995

Mj
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT: Q&SR% OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL W. STRAND, et ai.,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. ROKICH
IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO
SET ASIDE DISMISSAL AND
REINSTATE PLAINTIFF'S ACTION

v.
LELAND MARTINEAU, et al. ,

Case No. 810905200CV
Judge William 3. 3ohling

Defendants.
County of Tooele

)

State of Utah

) ss
)

John A. Rokich, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
1.

Affiant is a member cf the Utah Bar in good standing.

2.

Affiant is familiar with and has personal knowledge of the

statements set forth in this Affidavit.
3.

Affiant was the judge assigned to the above entitled

matter when it came before Affiant pursuant

to a scheduling

conference, en September 17, 1994.
4.

Affiant is competent to testify, and if called to testify,

his testimony would establish the facts averred in this Affidavit.
5.

At the September 17, 1994 scheduling conference between

the Court and the above mentioned parties, Defendants' counsel,
Roger Sandack, indicated that he would be replaced by subsequent
counsel and would not be the attorney representing the defendants

000306
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at Uxe time of trial,
6. Based on the disclosures of Mr* Sandack, and the consent
of Mr- Petty, Affiant determined that it would be inappropriate to
enter a scheduling order when counsel for Defendants was changing.
Affiant intended to set a schedule for the completion of this
action after Defendants' new counsel had been designated. Affiant
intended to take no further action in relation to this case until
substitute counsel for Defendants was designated.
7. A trial had been scheduled in this case for January, 1994.
At a pretrial hearing for the trial, the parties, with Affiant's
consent, agreed to continue the trial, without date.
< 0

DATED this

day of August, 1995.

X

\ J o h r i A. Rokich

1995.
I

S u b s c r i b e d and sworn b e f o r e me t h i s
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I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to Michael L. Deamer, 139 East South Temple # 330,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, this

August, 1995.
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